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Naming and disrupting epistemic injustice across curated sites of learning

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ABSTRACT

Curated sites of learning—places that are created by people to promote formal and informal knowledge and knowledge production practices (such as schools and museums)—are deemed foundational by many societies in assisting children to become knowers. However, curated sites of learning can also uphold ways of knowing that can cause harm to people marginalized from knowledge production, which philosophers describe as epistemic injustice. By looking across fields of research (education and philosophy), I describe how epistemic injustice can be utilized in education research to provide a shared analytical lens for examining curated sites of learning. I name four levels of interaction in which epistemic injustice can occur given their purposeful design by people with power: moment-to-moment interactions, micro (within a site), meso (between local sites) and macro (between sites and national/international policies and rhetoric). I describe how educators and researchers might disrupt epistemic injustice through the examination of curated learning sites and their personal ideas about knowledge. I also highlight tensions and dilemmas that might arise for educators and researchers when engaged in such work.

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Educators and researchers are growing increasingly aware of how learning is inexorably intertwined with sociopolitical cultures (McKinney de Royston & Sengupta-Irving, 2019), and that curated sites of learning embody the explicit and implicit messages about knowing and knowledge production that people with power wish future generations of participants to learn (Philip, T. M., & Sengupta, P., 2020). By curated sites of learning, I mean that places are

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created and monitored by people (such as schools and museums) to promote knowledge they hope children might take up and use. Such curated sites should be places in which learning and participation in knowledge practices are wonderful and inspiring. However, as McHugh (2017) notes, curated sites of learning have the potential to confer ways of knowing that can cause harm, such as privileging certain knowledge that maintains inequities, dismissing particular forms of participation, and confining the lenses through which children learn to see the world.

The potential harm to children—as both individuals and communities—that concerns knowledge is referred to as *epistemic injustice* by philosophers (Dotson, 2012; Fricker, 2007; Murrin, 2013). While education scholars have long addressed issues of power and knowledge, naming such harm as epistemic injustice provides a language for examining assumptions and framings of who can know, what should be known, and how such knowledge should be learned.

While curated sites of learning can inflict epistemic injustice, recent examples, such as international efforts to confront colonialism embedded in national standards (such as the Maori people of New Zealand demanding that students learn about atrocities committed by the colonizing British, see Menon, 2021), implore educators and researchers to consider their role in matters of knowledge practices. Given that dominant groups often silence and erase the knowledge of marginalized people through curated sites of learning, we must name when and where such epistemic injustice occurs, and consider how such injustice can be disrupted through teaching, research and advocacy.

As a construct, I propose that epistemic injustice is underutilized in research and partnerships. For example, a keyword search of the *Journal of the Learning Sciences* revealed two articles that mention epistemic injustice: Barzilai and Chinn (2018), who describe epistemic injustice as a challenge facing education, and Philip, T. M., & Sengupta, P. (2020), who worry that epistemic injustice “employs relatively individualistic lens without engaging with the imperial roots of epistemic violence or consider the ways in which the labor of endarkened peoples are entangled with disciplines and professions” (p. 13). A keyword search of *Cognition and Instruction* also yielded two articles: Agarwal and Sengupta-Irving (2019), who describe epistemic injustice as a means to undermine epistemic diversity, and Rahm (2019), who notes in a commentary that authors in a special issue provide “a range of methods and designs that redress epistemic injustice” (p. 409). Thus, epistemic injustice is part of conversations, but educators and researchers have not yet decided how this lens might help frame the design and examination of research and partnerships.

This commentary has three purposes. First, I advocate for the utility of epistemic injustice as an analytical lens to name a shared problem across curated sites of learning. Second, I highlight how educators and researchers might name epistemic injustice at four levels of learning: moment-to-moment interactions, micro (within a site), meso (between local sites), and macro (between sites and national/international policies and rhetoric). Third, I describe how educators and researchers might disrupt epistemic injustice.

While I advocate for epistemic injustice as an analytical lens, this commentary should not be interpreted as a “rhetoric of beginnings” (Dotson, 2014) or an “origin story” (Pohlhaus, 2017) of a novel perspective. I did not create the term *epistemic injustice*, nor am I the first scholar to illuminate the harm inflicted on marginalized communities when their knowledge practices are constrained by dominant groups. Education scholars have long examined the ethics, politics, and sociology of knowledge practices (including Lilia Bartolomé, Gloria Ladson-Billings, Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux, Kris Gutiérrez, Carol Lee, Danny Martin, and Na’ilah Nasir), and we should continue to learn from and build on their extensive research.

Finally, there are two foundational points to establish. First, while epistemology is foregrounded in this commentary, ontology and epistemology are inextricably intertwined and impact each other; ontologies shape how dominant groups choose to position others as capable (or not) of knowledge production. Second, neither dominant groups nor marginalized people are monolithic entities, and people within groups enact forms of agency to resist and negotiate power. In addition, there are a plurality of ways of knowing and stratified distributions of power within communities. As a result, analyses of interactions between dominant and marginalized groups should consider how participatory opportunities for some people may silence others.

Defining epistemic injustice

Building on extensive scholarship and social movements the term *epistemic injustice* was coined by Miranda Fricker (2007), and sits at the intersection of philosophy, ethics, and epistemology (Pohlhaus, 2017). Broadly, epistemic injustice involves inequitable treatment that relates to issues of knowledge practices, (mis)communication, (mis)information, and truth (Dotson, 2012; Fricker, 2007). Kidd et al. (2017) provide example questions that arise when viewing sites through a lens of epistemic injustice:

Who has voice and who doesn't? Are voices interacting with equal agency and power? In whose terms are they communicating? Who is being understood and who isn't (and at what cost)? Who is being believed? And who is even being acknowledged and engaged with? (p. 1)

Thus, epistemic injustice illuminates issues of credibility, authority, and testimony with regards to how marginalized people are treated as knowers by people with power. Importantly, epistemic injustice is an outcome of larger inequities that skew how people in power learn to see the world. For example, epistemic injustice can result from sociopolitical and economic inequities that emphasize White, Western, heteronormative, individual, and masculine values (e.g., Medin & Bang, 2014).

Epistemic injustice is enacted in at least four forms. First, marginalized people can be harmed by “testimonial injustice,” in which a speaker suffers from a credibility deficit and their claims of knowledge are dismissed. Thus, people with power inflict harm by silencing or suppressing speech, and by diminishing opportunities for those who are marginalized to know and produce knowledge (Dotson, 2011; Fricker, 2007). Over time, testimonial injustice can lead to people feeling excluded from knowledge production and denied opportunities to participate in knowledge practices (Goldberg, 2017). In addition, testimonial injustice harms people who may have benefitted from hearing the knowledge of those who are denied opportunities to speak (Congdon, 2017).

Second, marginalized people can suffer from “hermeneutical injustice,” in which power relations, structural prejudice, and a lack of epistemic resources undermine the knower's ability to make sense of their own experiences, or to explain their knowledge to others. Often, hermeneutical injustice results from purposefully limited opportunities to learn about histories that led to the oppression of marginalized people, thus restricting how impactful marginalized people's knowledge claims might be to potential listeners (Fricker, 2007).

Third, people with power can inflict “intrapersonal injustice,” in which they do not allow their views to be informed by people they choose to marginalize (Pohlhaus, 2012). Here, those in power neither understand how to listen to marginalized people, nor do they choose to learn from people who might challenge dominant norms. Subsequently, people with power may choose to position marginalized people as incapable of participation in knowledge production (Fricker, 2007).

Fourth, people with power can inflict “hierarchical injustice” by creating infrastructures to ignore, distort, and discredit knowledge practices that run counter to dominant norms (Mohanty, 2004). Within infrastructures, features such as artifacts and standards bound interactive possibilities in ways that frame how people with power choose what is epistemically significant and worthy of attention (Goldberg, 2017).

Taken together, these four forms of epistemic injustice allow people with power to purposefully exclude certain individuals and communities from knowledge production while simultaneously creating and mandating participation in the very institutions that enforce an inequitable epistemic hierarchy (Frank, 2013; Fricker, 2012). Such participation can lead to marginalized people becoming trapped in cycles of epistemic oppression in which they are seen as unreliable speakers, as incapable of knowledge production, and as occupying a lower epistemic status (Burroughs & Tollefsen, 2016).

Intersections with education research

Given the types of epistemic injustice, there are two clear intersections with education research. First, questions about “what counts” as knowledge and knowledge practices are foundational for educators. Researchers and educators consider how knowledge is learned, negotiated, and dismissed across curated sites of learning, such as:

- In schools. For example, Gresalfi et al. (2009) investigated agency in mathematics classrooms, and Lee (2006), as well as the Chèche Konnen Center work of Warren et al. (2001), examined learning environments that leverage everyday knowledge of culturally diverse students to support subject-matter-specific learning.
- Informal spaces. For example, Greenberg et al. (2020) examined youths efforts and epistemologies around critical maker-entrepreneurialism in informal settings.
- Across sites in organizations. For example, Engeström and Sannino (2021), examined learning and knowledge production in multiple national-level organizations such as the judiciary and health care in Finland.

Such studies suggest that relationships between knowledge, agency, and authority are becoming increasingly important in education research.

Second, education research has engaged with complex issues of power and knowledge practices. Scholars have illuminated how divisions in power among actors have a bearing on what knowledge is developed and how knowledge is communicated (e.g., Bang et al., 2012; Gutiérrez, 2003). Thus, research about education and epistemic injustice is concerned with the design of sites of learning, the analysis of knowledge production, the relationships between power and knowing, and the role “naming” problems plays in working toward equity and social justice.

Epistemic injustice in curated sites of learning

I propose that epistemic injustice could be a powerful analytic lens when examining curated sites of learning. Since such sites play a crucial role in enforcing the knowledge and knowledge practices valued by people with power, we might examine curated sites of learning in at least four interacting levels of learning opportunities (see [Table 1](#) for more examples of potential injustices and analyses at each level).

Moment-to-moment interactions

One level of epistemic injustice can occur in moment-to-moment interactions between various people. For example, teachers are positioned with epistemic authority. The children that teachers choose to recognize as having important ideas, and the actions teachers take to elevate or dismiss such ideas are opportunities for epistemic injustice to occur (Kotzee, 2017). If a child's ideas are continually dismissed by a teacher, other children, or other school-based actors, Medina (2017) cautions that the marginalized youth can experience hermeneutical death—when their voice and their sense-making practices are denied as irrelevant and useless. For example, in multiple classrooms I observed in American secondary schools, some teachers make clear to students that unless their ideas are “canonically correct,” students should not speak. Thus, students stop participating in such classrooms (Stroupe, 2016).

Additionally, people with power might engage in epistemic coercion, in which they compel children to produce words and practices that align with dominant norms of talk and knowledge production (Medina, 2017). For example, in many sites of science learning, people with power might label the words and ideas of marginalized children as “unscientific” (Bang et al., 2012). Such coercion is purposeful as people with power mandate how knowledge and knowledge production should proceed. Over time, repeated attempts at epistemic coercion might result in testimonial smothering, in which marginalized children remain silent, anticipating that someone with authority is unwilling or unable to hear value in their ideas (Dotson, 2011; Hookway, 2010).

Micro-level: Within a site

Possibilities for epistemic injustice also exist on micro-levels. Curated sites of learning surround children with representations of valued knowledge and knowledge practices, and such representations carry explicit and implicit requests for epistemic compliance (Code, 1993; Murriss, 2013). Children who comply with dominant epistemic practices are rewarded, while children who

Table 1. Potential examples of epistemic injustice.

	Moment-to-moment interactions	Micro-level: Within a site	Meso-level: Sites within communities	Macro-level: Sites within national/international systems
Testimonial injustice	A museum employee interrupts a child's story to "fix" their "incorrect" statement.	Teachers tell students that certain ways of speaking are not "proper" or "accepted" in school.	In a meeting with local parents, school administrators suggest that marginalized students might be "slow learners" because of cultural "deficits."	A nationally-funded museum dismisses concerns about racist exhibits by framing Indigenous communities as unbelievable and wrong in their interpretation of history.
Hermeneutical injustice	A White teacher makes a racist comment to a Black student, but the student does not recognize the comment as racist because such comments are frequent and never challenged.	LGBTQIA+ students at a university face daily discrimination, but cannot articulate their concerns because the students assume such discrimination is a "normal" part of the university and no preventative policies exist to stop the discrimination.	White library staff never stock books from local Black and Brown authors, denying local community members an opportunity to read such texts.	Indigenous students are forced to attend nationally-funded schools to erase their knowledge and practices while "converting" them to White knowledge practices.
Intrapersonal injustice	A teacher refuses to hear students' ideas as anything other than "misconceptions" and incorrect because the ideas do not align with the teacher's understanding of canonical content.	A White school principal denies Black and Brown students the opportunity to present ideas during a school-wide program because the principal believes such ideas are disruptive.	Aquarium staff dismiss Indigenous perspectives on conservation as "unscientific" despite Indigenous groups' efforts to express ideas.	A school district refuses to hear concerns about racist content in national textbooks, noting that the textbooks are written by "experts" who know more history than marginalized community members.
Hierarchical injustice	A teacher establishes norms for talk in a classroom that restrict the language resources of multilingual students.	A teaching team creates a mandatory assignment in which students must consider the benefits and "both sides" of human rights abuses such as slavery.	A museum creates exhibits that purposefully discredit knowledge of local marginalized people.	States adopt a curriculum that presents false and discriminatory ideas in order to teach "correct" history to marginalized youth.

fall outside the “acceptable” range of practices are dismissed (Collins, 1991; McKinney, 2016; Steele, 2010). For example, for decades, Peru mandated Spanish-only language spoken in schools despite 45% of students coming from Indigenous groups, each with their own languages (Hornberger, 1987). By banning languages used by Indigenous people through the forced assimilation into colonial discourse (Spanish), schools might cause children to question if knowledge practices that are valued in other settings (such as those enacted by communities, elders, and families) will ever be valued within curated sites of learning.

People with power might also develop biases about which children are smart. At a micro-level, such biases can result in epistemic objectification, in which a group of children’s actual or imagined epistemic “weaknesses” or “strengths” (as labeled by people with power) are wrongly taken to be due to the group’s “nature,” or are “essential” to them as a group (Gutiérrez & Rogoff, 2003; Haslanger, 2017). As people with power design policies that create opportunities for success or failure according to dominant norms, they might also create a feedback loop of reinforcing the very stereotypes that prompted the epistemic objectification.

Finally, people with power signal epistemic authority through hiring decisions. The people brought into curated sites of learning to teach children, serve as administrators, and perform important duties may or may not represent the diversity of the community. Thus, people with power make choices about what epistemic norms to value, and hire people to enforce such values with children (Kotzee, 2017).

Meso-level: Sites within communities

Curated sites of learning are part of larger communities. Therefore, epistemic injustice can occur on a meso-level in which communities and curated sites of learning interact. For example, curated sites of learning may be denied epistemic resources (objects that reify particular knowledge, such as curricula, textbooks, hardware/software, and funds). Alternatively, epistemic resources might be unevenly distributed across sites depending on preferences of people with power (Goldberg, 2017; Kotzee, 2017).

Epistemic resources can also reify dominant epistemic practices. When potential epistemic resources might trouble dominant narratives about knowledge, people with power quickly mobilize to deny “alternative” knowledge narratives in curated sites of learning. When children and marginalized people attempt to advocate for their needs, people with power can inflict epistemic compliance or violence through institutions they design and enforce (Spivak, 1988). For example, when Seattle Public Schools in the United States attempted to enact an anti-racist mathematics framework for all K-12 children, some powerful local and national people (mostly White)

attempted to block the framework by claiming on various media outlets (blog posts, radio shows, and newspaper editorials) that mathematics was objective, unbiased, and not racist (Gewertz, 2019; Takahama, 2019). The Seattle mathematics framework example illustrates how people with power outside of schools care deeply about how certain epistemic norms are embedded in knowledge-bearing resources, and attempt to force schools to uphold dominant epistemic practices (Kotzee, 2017).

When curated sites of learning become places of epistemic injustice, children and marginalized communities face difficult choices. For example, marginalized people might send their children to curated sites of learning while realizing the potential for familial and local epistemic practices to be erased given of many historic breaches of trust (Hawley, 2017). Such distrust is understandable: why should marginalized people trust institutions who deny meaningful knowledge production opportunities for their children (Grasswick, 2017; Hankinson Nelson, 1990)?

Macro-level: Sites within national/international systems

Finally, curated sites of learning are also potentially saturated with macro-level forms of epistemic injustice from national or international systems. As noted, epistemic systems and institutions can be designed to include or exclude various knowledge communities (Dotson, 2014). Within such systems, asymmetrical epistemic authority often creates two classes of participants—those with power and ability to create systems of knowledge, and those who are forced to participate (Medina, 2013). By mandating participation in curated sites of learning, people with power signal particular epistemic commitments that are necessary for children to participate in society, such as whose knowledge matters (often White, masculine, European, cis-gender, heteronormative, Christian), how knowledge should be communicated (focusing on particular forms of academic language), and how knowledge should be demonstrated (standardized testing, recitation of “canonical” information) (Alcoff, 2017). In addition, an epistemic arrogance of people with power can result in the purposeful design of institutions to aid in the conquest of marginalized communities. For example, Indigenous communities in the Americas were terrorized for generations by the forced separation of their children into schools for the purpose of reeducation into dominant forms of knowing (History of The National Native American Boarding School Healing Coalition, 2020). Such a forced separation program is now underway in China to reeducate the Uighur ethnic group (Sudworth, 2019).

Using schools for nation-wide forms of indoctrination is intentional, and stems from a desire to inflict epistemic harm upon marginalized children because people with power wish to selectively promote knowledge and

knowledge practices that will affirm and perpetuate their grip on power. This purposeful refusal to listen to how others experience the world, and the denial of opportunities for those voices to shape the public narrative and understanding of the world, is aided by people with power actively driving conversations about the purpose of curated sites of learning (Pohlhaus, 2012).

Disrupting epistemic injustice

Naming epistemic injustice at four levels is the first step toward reimagining and redesigning sites as places that provide children with different learning opportunities, to collectively recognize and value children as burgeoning knowers, and to gain their trust as people who care about their well-being (Congdon, 2017). Regardless of our relationship with curated sites of learning, there are internal and external efforts that are needed to remake such sites.

Looking inward, educators and researchers must realize that, intentionally or unintentionally, they might dismiss children's ideas simply because they are unable to hear and value the words, experiences, and practices spoken by those positioned on the outside of dominant forms of participation (Fricker, 2017). As people with power, we must resist calls to disqualify words, experiences, and practices of children by discarding epistemic arrogance and realizing that others may experience the world in ways we cannot (Heldke, 2006; Medina, 2013). Thus, educators and researchers must acknowledge biases around whose knowledge matters and how such knowledge is recognized as valuable. In addition, educators and researchers must recognize that children, especially from marginalized groups, develop subversive lucidity, in which they can articulate assumptions and prejudices that people with power choose to ignore (Medina, 2013). Finally, educators and researchers must recognize that acts of epistemic resistance, such as separatism (refusing to engage in dialogue with dominant groups) and proposing alternative knowledge frameworks are necessary avenues for marginalized children (McHugh, 2017). Rather than dismiss or punish epistemic resistance, educators and researchers must interrogate how and why the institutions they established are creating the necessity for such actions.

Looking externally, there are at least four disruptions to epistemic injustice that educators and researchers can enact. While categorizing disruptions is useful to name actions, epistemic injustice is often perpetuated across levels of learning. Please see [Table 2](#) for one example of how the creation of the 1776 Commission and Curriculum by the Trump administration could be analyzed and disrupted across levels.

Table 2. An example of cross-level epistemic injustice and potential disruptions.

Type of injustice	Moment-to-moment interactions	Micro-level: Within a site	Meso-level: Sites within communities	Macro-level: Sites within national/international systems
Testimonial injustice	Injustice: Students propose that American “founding fathers” purposefully preserved slavery, and the teacher tells students that they are wrong to think that America is racist. Disruption (Naming): After the student comment, the teacher asks the class to consider the idea, and to think about other examples in which Black and Brown people have been harmed by those in power.	Injustice: A high school’s history department declares that the 1776 Curriculum presents <i>the</i> “correct” version of history, and any attempts to provide alternative interpretations will be halted. Disruption (Friction, resources): Students, teachers, and administrators provide alternative spaces and texts outside the 1776 Curriculum for learning about history.	Injustice: School administrators suggest in a meeting with parents that marginalized students’ perspectives about their histories are outside the scope of the 1776 Curriculum. Disruption (Friction): A parent asks the principal to justify why students’ perspectives will not be heard.	Injustice: A Congressional education committee refuses to hear testimony from marginalized people about potential impacts of the 1776 Commission Report and Curriculum. Disruption (Naming, Friction): Marginalized communities protest outside the USA Capitol Building, telling their concerns to news agencies.
Hermeneutical injustice	Injustice: A video suggested by the 1776 Curriculum makes false and racist claims about history, but students do not recognize the claims as racist because there are no other resources to provide a counter-narrative. Disruption (Resources): Students and teachers utilize other resources to trouble the false claims.	Injustice: The struggle for LGBTQIA+ rights is not mentioned in the 1776 Curriculum, and thus students are deprived of opportunities to understand their history. Disruption (Listening): Students, teachers, and administrators provide space and time for LGBTQIA+ students to share their stories, and to take actions toward equity.	Injustice: School administrators request that local libraries remove books offering counter-perspectives to the 1776 Curriculum. Disruption (Naming, Resources): Students and community members protest the removal of the books and provide alternative resources for the community.	Injustice: Black and Brown students are forced to attend schools with a mandate from a national committee to erase cultural knowledge while “converting” the marginalized students to knowledge and practices valued in the 1776 Curriculum. Disruption (Resources): Black and Brown communities establish alternative schools and educational opportunities to provide knowledge and practices to the future generations.

(Continued)

Table 2. (Continued).

Type of injustice	Moment-to-moment interactions	Micro-level: Within a site	Meso-level: Sites within communities	Macro-level: Sites within national/international systems
Intrapersonal injustice	Injustice: A teacher dismisses students' ideas about history as "misconceptions," because the ideas do not align with the teacher's understanding of curricular content. Disruption (Listening): The teacher asks students for help in understanding their perspective because the teacher wants to learn from students' ideas.	Injustice: A white school principal denies Black and Brown students the opportunity to present ideas during a school-wide program because the principal believes such ideas are not aligned with the 1776 Curriculum. Disruption: (Friction, Listening) Students hold an alternative assembly in which perspectives outside the curriculum are heard.	Injustice: School staff dismisses community members' perspectives about the 1776 Commission as "fake history." Disruption (Friction, Resources): Community members hold forums to showcase their histories and work with agencies to publicize their stories.	Injustice: The USA Department of Education dismisses concerns that the 1776 Commission Report is false and racist, framing people who question the resources as uncredible and wrong in their interpretation of history. Disruption (Naming): State and local boards of education, along with community members, write letters to news outlets requesting the removal of the 1776 Curriculum from schools. Injustice: State departments of education require local districts to adopt the 1776 Curriculum.
Hierarchical injustice	Injustice: A teacher establishes norms for opportunities to question the 1776 Curriculum. Disruption (Friction): The teacher purposefully builds opportunities for students to question the 1776 curriculum.	Injustice: A teaching team creates a mandatory assignment in which students must uphold racist ideas of the 1776 Curriculum. Teachers refuse to assign the work, providing students with a different assignment focusing on universal human rights.	Injustice: A school partners with local stores to display student-made art that was based on the 1776 Curriculum, yet the art showcases false and racist images. Disruption (Friction, Resources): Community members provide alternative art and ask stores about their decision to highlight the 1776 Curriculum.	Disruption Naming, Resources): Local school actors and community members create/identify alternative curricula, and work along various avenues (legal, political, social) to halt the 1776 Curriculum.

Table 2 provides an example of epistemic injustice and potential disruptions across levels: The 1776 Commission (see <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/The-Presidents-Advisory-1776-Commission-Final-Report.pdf> for a free copy of the report), and subsequent 1776 Curriculum created by Hillsdale College (see <https://k12.hillsdale.edu/Curriculum/The-Hillsdale-1776-Curriculum/> to request a free copy). During 2020 in the United States, President Trump created the "1776 Commission" to promote "patriotic" education through a "pro-American curriculum" that would require schools to cease "indoctrinating" students with anti-American ideas (Crowley & Schuessler, 2021). However, the report was "filled with errors and partisan politics" aimed at disseminating a false and racist version of history (Crowley, 2020). As noted by historian James Grossman, the 1776 Commission report "skillfully weaves together myths, distortions, deliberate silences, and both blatant and subtle misreading of evidence to create a narrative and an argument that few respectable professional historians, even across a wide interpretive spectrum, would consider plausible" (Crowley & Schuessler, 2021). For example, the 1776 Commission report downplayed America's "Founding Fathers'" roles in owning slaves, and likened the Progressive movement in America to Fascism (Crowley & Schuessler, 2021). Table 2 imagines a scenario in which a school district adopts the 1776 Curriculum and presents four potential disruptions: Naming, epistemic friction, virtuous listening, and anti-oppressive epistemic resources.

- *Naming* specific groups of people who are harmed and how they are harmed. Such naming is especially important to confront generic language of helping “all children” learn. For example, designing interventions to help “all children” does not unearth how daily inequities built into society (such as racism, sexism, and classism) result in disproportionate acts of epistemic injustice inflicted upon marginalized children (N. Shah, personal communication, September 21, 2020);
- Creating and examining opportunities for beneficial *epistemic friction* (Medina, 2013), in which children and adults from various knowledge systems interact, work together, learn to understand and value each other, and create shared and alternative meaning together.
- Learning to engage in *virtuous listening* (Burroughs & Tollefsen, 2016; Fricker, 2017), which includes knowing when to remain silent, when to suspend judgment about knowledge and knowledge practices, calling critical attention to one’s limited experiences and interpretative expectations, and letting marginalized people create the dynamics for communicative exchange (Medina, 2017);
- Actively designing and leveraging anti-oppressive *epistemic resources* to undermine and change oppressive institutional structures (Medina, 2013).

By naming epistemic injustice at four levels of curated sites of learning, and by considering internal and external steps toward examining and disrupting how epistemic injustice transpires, educators and researchers can begin to examine and dismantle the structures and institutions that people with power purposefully built to advance an epistemic agenda that helps perpetuate dominant forms of participation (Alcoff, 2017; Haslanger, 2017).

Tensions and dilemmas

While naming and disrupting epistemic injustice is crucial, as educators and researchers we know that identifying and addressing such injustice in curated sites of learning is complex. There are at least two tensions and dilemmas to consider when reimagining curated sites of learning through a lens of epistemic injustice.

First, given that people with power are not a monolithic group, the actions of different actors can cause tensions given varied interpretations of knowledge practices. As Harding (2008) notes, while some powerful people aim to recognize and elevate marginalized people’s ideas to shape epistemic practices, other powerful people see such ideas as incommensurate with their understanding of knowledge. Such tensions lead to questions that powerful people must confront: How should ideas from marginalized knowers shape curated sites of learning? Should all ways of knowing be included, or should

criteria be developed to decide which ideas should be considered? Can current curated sites of learning support knowledge from marginalized people, or are new sites required? As educators and researchers, we must aim to understand how different actors frame knowledge practices in relation to how they choose to recognize and promote from ideas marginalized communities.

Second, sometimes people who believe they are harmed are actually part of dominant groups, and can perpetuate epistemic injustice under auspices of marginalization (Goldberg, 2017). For example, some dominant Christian groups wish for Creationism to be taught alongside evolution, for prayer to be part of daily classroom routines, and for bible study to be offered in American public schools. However, such requests have been denied in multiple court cases (see Lupu et al., 2019, for an overview). While dominant Christian groups might claim marginalization in public schools, their lawsuits and actions perpetuate epistemic injustice. By showcasing dominant Christian versions of history in public sites as canonical knowledge and by dismissing non-Christian epistemologies as invalid, such groups perpetuate colonialist actions that have occurred for millennia (Dübgen, 2016). Therefore, as educators and researchers, we must ask: What is marginalized, in what ways, and in relation to whom? How do we ensure that the voices of the most impacted are elevated rather than those who claim oppression in order to perpetuate injustice?

Despite these tensions and dilemmas, curated sites of learning have the potential to set new conditions that promote knowledge diversity and to negotiate new means of knowledge production (McHugh, 2017). However, as Dotson (2011) reminds us, “[t]o communicate, we all need an audience willing and capable of hearing us” (p. 238). Thus, as educators and researchers, the onus is on us to listen, learn, and actively disrupt oppressive institutions which perpetuate epistemic injustice and harm children.

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